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The connection that is said to exist between some forms of religious or political extremism 
and terrorism has proved useful in terms of justifying law and policy. This postulated 
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Abstract 
Drawing on both official and scholastic descriptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Generation Identity, this article suggests that in the UK context, some striking similarities 
exist between the two organisations. Both represent ostensibly nonviolent permutations of 
their respective extremist movements. Despite this similarity, a stark distinction exists in 
the response of the UK government. Although, like many Islamist civil society actors, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has benefited from the perception that nonviolent extremist groups 
can help address terrorism and radicalisation, the same contention is yet to be made 
regarding political extremists from within the far right. This article first uses the Muslim 
Brotherhood as an example to illustrate the standards that have been contrived in the UK 
for distinguishing nonviolent extremist organisations from their violent counterparts. The 
intention here is to demonstrate that just as the Muslim Brotherhood is identified as the 
prototypical example of ‘political Islam’, counterparts for this type of organisation can be 
found in different extremist contexts. It will be postulated that in particular, Generation 
Identity may be thought of as occupying an analogous position within the context of far-
right extremism. The purpose of this comparison is to explore the viability of utilising 
‘nonviolent extremists’ to prevent violent extremism across different movements; it will be 
contended that although the results of such an arrangement could be replicated, there is a 
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relationship has also proved useful in addressing the political extreme right, showing the 
connection between the aspects of extreme far-right politics and violence against certain 
identity groups; this has been frequently asserted as the basis to supress ethnonationalist and 
extreme nationalist groups (Rydgren et al., 2018). Perhaps as a result of this process, new 
extreme right-wing organisations have sought to divest themselves of their connections to 
previous groups and now often visibly emphasise nonviolent forms of activism, with a 
characteristic example being the transnational Identitarian movement (Azmanova & Dakwar, 
2019). Even when far-right groups make such commitments, however, scepticism often 
remains, with some going as far as to suggest that groups orientated around this political 
ideology have an intrinsic relationship with violence (Murdoch, 2019). Although this 
scepticism is perhaps warranted given the past trajectory of extreme right-wing groups, it 
potentially precludes working with the wider far-right movement to address the terrorism and 
violent extremism found on its fringes.  
The link between Islamist religious extremism and terrorist violence has also caused 
the UK government to advance law and policy options, with numerous examples of this 
taking place (Home Office, 2019). This pattern does not hold in relation to all forms of 
Islamic extremism, however, with some extremist groups being identified as part of the 
solution. Characteristic of this inversion is the manner in which the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) has been identified as a potential ‘firewall’ against Islamist or jihadist terrorism 
(Parliament UK, 2017). The argument is that by suppressing the MB and comparable 
organisations, the UK would make individuals more likely to resort to violence in pursuit of 
their aims because the political option provided by the MB being would be unavailable 
(Parliament UK, 2017, p. 3). Although many remain sceptical, it is not unusual to see civil 
society actors advocating for the MB on this basis (Barlow, 2018; Bushra, 2014). Moreover, it 
has been postulated that a policy of tolerance and engagement yields additional rewards in 
terms of intelligence and community cohesion (Hellyer, 2007, p. 20), enhancing the 
effectiveness of counter extremist programmes and initiatives (Cherney & Hartley, 2017, pp. 
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possibility of using other types of nonviolent extremist organisations in a similar partnership 
approach merits consideration.  
Spurred by the fear that acts of terror similar to those witnessed in Norway and New 
Zealand could be replicated (Stott, 2019), far-right terrorism is now steadily moving up the 
UK security agenda. At some point, it may be anticipated that the threat of far-right violence 
may eclipse that of ‘jihadist’ terrorism, as is the case in the US (Byman, 2020). To address 
this rising trend, a number of solutions applicable to other forms of extremism have been 
considered in relation to this rising threat (Koehler, 2019). Indeed, UK authorities have 
already gone as far as to incorporate ‘former’ far-right activists into initiatives to help address 
this growing threat.2 Extrapolating such trends, it is not unthinkable to suggest that a 
partnership with an active nonviolent extremist organisation could be implemented, mirroring 
the in place for Islamist groups. Given the benefits of ‘firewalling’ alleged in relation to 
Islamic extremism, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a similar strategy may be fruitfully 
employed to mitigate the threat of far-right terror. If this approach was to be taken, then a 
priority would be identifying a partner similar to the MB within the extreme far-right to 
replicate the same alleged benefits. The far-right is, after all, an umbrella term encapsulating a 
range of groups, ideologies, actions and behaviours (Mudde, 1995). Somewhere within this 
morass of opinions and approaches, there is likely a possible partner to be found. In this 
regard, it can be postulated that Generation Identity (GI) or a similar Identitarian group can 
serve as one such possibility for attempting such an arrangement. Using this group can be 
suggested based on GI’s most visible features, which emulate those of the MB in a rough 
sense: a transnational organisation, vocally committed to nonviolence and with an established 
branch in the UK. If such a policy was to be implemented to address the far-right, then GI 
may represent a strong possibility for a partnership. 
The intention of the current paper is to first provide an overview of both the MB and 
GI, here with a focus on the operations of their respective national branches within the UK. It 
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will be demonstrated that there are some similarities between the two. Emphasis will be given 
to the position of both groups within their respective movements, emphasising the manner in 
which both groups have sought to emphasise their nonviolent methods while maintaining a 
consistent end goal. GI will then be shown to possess similar characteristics to those 
expressed by the MB. This will serve as an initial indication that it is possible to replicate the 
partnership approach, notwithstanding the existence of some distinctive challenges.  
Based on the existence of a viable nonviolent extremist group within the extreme 
right, the present study will pose the following question: Why, given their similarities, is the 
MB embraced as a firewall against extremism, while GI and the political extreme right are 
excluded from similar counterextremist initiatives? It will ultimately be asserted that although 
it is possible to identify GI as a partner, the prospect of replicating the outcomes achieved in 
the initial context of Islamist extremism in relation to other emergent forms of extremism is a 
complex proposition. It is, for instance, possible to conclude that the MB has benefited from 
the status and influence conferred by partnership and providing an extreme right organisation 
with a comparable uplift may not be expedient, especially in light of the limited benefits that 
can be attributed directly to partnership arrangements of this nature. This, in addition to the 
absence of demand for such strategies in the far-right context, means that this approach is 
unlikely to be replicated. 
This exercise is timely; a piecemeal response to different types of extremism creates 
the appearance that the UK government is exhibiting bias, either failing to treat some 
movements with the caution that they merit or granting privileges to some extremist 
movements while excluding others. It is now often stressed that counterterrorism initiatives 
are predominantly targeted at addressing the Islamist threat (Ahmed & Bashirov, 2020; 
Stevenson, 2019). The current article seeks to examine some complexities that emerge when 
attempting to address this imbalance, applying exiting strategies to the now ascendant threat 
of the extreme right. It can also be contended that this process permits a reinterrogation of the 
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these cannot be replicated in relation to other extremist movements, then a basis exists to 
question their original justifications behind these policies and approaches. 
 
How to define an appropriate partnership with an extremist group 
 
Even in the absence of direct and explicit involvement in terrorism and political violence a 
relationship between nonviolent extremist groups and their violent counterparts can be 
hypothesised. The role that nonviolent groups can play in relation to terrorism has however 
been contentious, with the nature of this relationship subject to extensive debate. To 
summarise, nonviolent extremist groups have been suggested as either speeding up an 
individual’s progression into violence or, alternately, representing an alternative to violence, 
discouraging individuals from adopting more drastic and violent methods. 
The current paper first addresses the perspective that nonviolent extremist groups 
facilitate an individual’s path to violence or that such groups act as a ‘conveyor belt’ (Baran, 
2005). For instance, in the context of Islamic terrorism, it has been asserted that a number of 
key figures have graduated from ‘nonviolent’ groups to join or found violent ones, with a 
similar process having been alleged in relation to extreme right-wing terrorism (Orofino, 
2020). Although such cases are not necessarily typical of all individuals involved in 
nonviolent extremism, the connection has proved sufficient to allege that nonviolent groups 
constitute a security threats, irrespective of whether they actively engage in violence 
themselves. Such a perspective, when embraced, has far-reaching consequences; attempts to 
address the root causes of terrorism attempted through associated religious and civil society 
groups have drawn criticism from, among others, nonviolent extremist groups themselves. To 
return to the UK context, much of this criticism has coalesced around the government’s wider 
prevent strategy, which, at times, has emphasised the role that religious extremism plays in 
driving terrorism. Critics generally emphasise the absence of any deterministic, provable link 
between belief and violence, as well as the adverse impact that such an approach is alleged to 
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Serving as a counterpoint to the conveyor belt theory is the perspective that nonviolent 
extremists instead serve a valuable role in mitigating violent extremism, preventing the 
migration of individuals into more extreme groups. As an approach, ‘firewalling’ is fairly 
intuitive; it refers to the capacity for nonviolent extremist groups to decrease the risk of 
terrorism by providing potential terrorists with alternative avenues for change through 
political activism and individual development (Parliament UK, 2017). Identifying the groups 
capable of acting as a ‘firewall’ is an often-difficult exercise, however. As the concept of 
violent extremism is so hazily defined (Striegher, 2015), identifying a nonviolent extremist 
organisation is liable to be fraught with difficulties. It is, for instance, challenging to identify 
groups that are similar enough to share a common language and appeal to potential violent 
extremists while concurrently professing nonviolence to a sufficient degree to evade legal 
sanctions. The vague definition of radicalisation, as well as the changing relationship 
extremist groups often have with violence, further contribute to this difficulty, along with the 
unwillingness such groups may have to enter into arrangements with government or official 
bodies. Then, there are the selective policies applied by government and law enforcement 
partners, which need to ensure that the identified partners do not express sentiments or 
undertake actions that place them outside of the law. Finally, it is possible to stress the 
transnational nature of the challenge which moves such assessments beyond purely domestic 
considerations (Ranstorp, 2007, pp. 223–224). Any organisation considered for such a 
partnership must accordingly demonstrate that it is ‘fundamentally nonviolent’ (Parliament 
UK, 2017) and likely to remain committed to nonviolent activism. Recently, the concept of 
firewalling has been advocated fairly extensively, with some going as far as to suggest that 
former combatants can play a role in discouraging others from violence (Clubb, 2016).  
Based on official sources and descriptions, it is possible to determine a definition and 
some broad criteria used to identify the appropriate partners for community engagement and 
who can act as ‘firewalls’. For instance, it is possible to first eliminate groups that would be 
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openly sought to radicalise others.3 Organisations likely to be proscribed can also be 
considered inappropriate. Further illumination can be gained from examining the standards 
used by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) when it identified the MB as an 
appropriate partner, given that the MB remains the prototypical example of ‘firewalling’. In 
this regard, the concept of ‘political Islam’ was used to delineate groups committed to the 
political process from those that are not (Parliament UK, 2017). Specifically, three criteria 
have been established, as follows: 
 
Our general principles for engagement with Political Islamist parties and groups 
are their (i) rejection of violence; (ii) commitment to democratic processes with 
inclusive governance and tolerance of other faiths and minorities; and (iii) respect 
for international agreements. (Parliament UK, 2017, p. 4) 
 
There is certainly space to consider whether the MB itself meets these requirements. 
Indeed, to suggest that the UK’s permutation of the organisation is consistent with any of 
these criteria requires detaching the branch from its wider international organisation, as well 
as from the circumstances of its origins and much of its history. In the context of the current 
study, however, these three criteria can assist in identifying other potential partnerships to 
limit terrorism and political violence within other extremist movements. 
Alongside official perspectives, scholarship emphasises the value of partners to 
address terrorism. Investigations conducted into such programmes have revealed that a range 
of different strategies for community engagement have been trialled, with each approach 
bringing distinct benefits and drawbacks (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). In relation to 
nonviolent extremists or fundamentalists, scholars point to several benefits that cannot be 
replicated to the same extent by a partnership with more moderate groups and spokespeople 
 
3 Although the boundary between violent extremism and nonviolent extremism is often unclear, it is possible to 
identify certain views and behaviours that result in the individual or group being considered violent, such as 
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or broader strategies of engagement aimed at wider Muslim populations (Lambert, 2013, pp. 
223–224). Along with avoiding involving—and therefore stigmatising—the wider group in 
question (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016), several of these alleged benefits relate to limiting violent 
extremism and terrorism. It has frequently been alleged that nonviolent extremist groups can 
be used as community partners to address the threat of extremism because of their credibility 
within their respective wider community and their potential to engage potentially violent 
extremists. In relation to Islamic extremism, it is suspected that effective partners can use 
their knowledge of Islamic scripture and jurisprudence to offer convincing alternative 
interpretations (Hassan, 2015), leading individuals away from violence. 
Critics of ‘firewalling’ and similar partnerships have indicated the detrimental impact 
that such relationships impose. For instance, it can be suggested that in choosing to partner 
with such extremists, government agencies neglect relationships with moderates, failing to 
support the ongoing transition to modernity taking place within the faith (Desker & 
Ramakrishna, 2002, p. 167). Then, there is the view partnering with such groups ‘normalises’ 
the axioms and ideals that such groups hold, ultimately making the state a partner in the 
radicalisation process (Maher & Frampton, 2009, p. 12). Therefore, it is critical to balance the 
benefits and drawbacks of such a partnership. 
Although criticism of partnership arrangements is certainly present, it remains possible 
to stress that there is no empirically proven link between nonviolent extremism and terrorism 
(Briggs, 2010, p. 975). If this absence may serve as the basis for partnerships with nonviolent 
Islamic extremist organisations, then the same absence can be invoked in relation to other 
forms of nonviolent extremism. Concurrently, however, it must be acknowledged that the 
drawbacks alleged in relation to extremist Islamist partnerships are likely to remain in relation 
to other forms of nonviolent extremism, so comparable care must be taken in identifying 
potential partners. Applying the standards established for partnership to other strands of 
extremism is not, however, a simple task. The challenge relates to the absence of a clear 
definition of nonviolent groups that are applicable across different types of extremism. 






Christopher J. Morris: Can partnership approaches developed to prevent Islamic terrorism be 








ISSN: 2363-9849          
possible to draw on descriptions of appropriate partners provided by government and 
scholastic sources, it is difficult to truly determine what features to look for in a ‘firewall’ in 
other forms of extremist movement.  
If it is accepted that the case of the MB has some explanatory value in terms of 
defining what an extremist partnership looks like, then identifying groups that run in parallel 
with the MB in other extremist contexts could expedite the wider application of this strategy. 
If, as the current study suggests, an analogue for the MB is present in the extreme far-right, 
then an opportunity to attempt such a partnership exits. 
 
Features of the Muslim Brotherhood and Generation Identity 
 
As stated, it is difficult to understand the concept of ‘firewalling’ with any degree of certainty, 
particularly when moving beyond its initial boundaries in relation to ‘political Islam’. It can, 
however, be stated that the MB provides the prototypical example of such a partnership 
arrangement. In the UK context, the capacity for the MB to act as such has been actively 
considered. The UK is not alone in identifying the MB as a tool to be wielded against 
extremism and other ills. Comparable strategies can, for instance, be found in France (Peter, 
2006), with Germany also having recognised the organisation’s value as an instrument to 
further the country’s security (Steinberg, 2010). The MB has, for what it is worth, identified 
itself as capable of fulfilling such a role. It is not unfair to conclude that the MB represents an 
archetypical example of a nonviolent group. Identifying a potential candidate organisation or 
group to act as a ‘firewall’ within the context of far-right extremism can, therefore, be 
partially accomplished by identifying an organisation that holds a roughly analogous position 
within the ‘far-right’ to that occupied by the MB within its respective wider movement. 
The MB has represented a relatively stable presence within the wider Islamist 
movement. Unlike the more aggressive jihadist movements with which the MB arguably 
shares a vision (Counter Extremism Project, 2019), it claims to have committed itself to the 
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pp. 1–32). In terms of influences, although the MB draws heavily on Islamic theology and 
axioms, it has been profoundly influenced by both fascism and Marxism, replacing ideas of 
ethnic and class-based unity with religious oneness to better appeal to an Islamic audience 
(Chertoff, n.d.; Karsh, 2013, pp. 16–17). In turn, it has been cited as a key influence for more 
overtly violent movements like ISIS and al Qaeda (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). 
The MB has grown in scope from its origins in Egypt, now boasting a presence across 
the Muslim world and within the global Islamic diaspora, founding branches across Europe 
and North America (Vidino, 2011, pp. 6–7). The MB, although ostensibly nonviolent, has 
been designated a terrorist organisation on several occasions,4 and there are clear, 
demonstratable instances of its members engaging in violent behaviour, including 
assassinations, terrorist acts and even armed conflict (Rinehart, 2009). Arguably, its goal of 
completely eliminating all non-Islamic influences from public life is at odds with the 
approach it expresses; indeed, it has been implied that the MB is rather circumspect when 
addressing its target audience, with the veneer of nonviolence cultivated purely for the benefit 
of external observers (Kuran, 1998). Nevertheless, its failure to commit to the type of jihad 
advocated for by prominent ‘name brand’ movements such as ISIS has led to criticism and 
infighting with other groups on several documented occasions (Leiken & Brooke, 2007, p. 
107). 
As a transnational movement, the MB has become prominent in a number of different 
regions, often presenting a different profile to take advantage of different circumstances and 
prevailing conditions (Lynch, 2016). In the UK, the MB has succeeded in presenting itself as 
a potential ‘firewall’ against extremism, with the FCO having recognised the value of the 
group in stabilising democratic transitions (Parliament UK, 2017), building on the 
longstanding sentiment that engagement with the Muslim community mitigates 
fundamentalist terrorism (O’toole et al., 2016; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). The argument is that 
by restricting political Islam, the UK government enables violent Islamists to gain ground 
 
4 114th CONGRESS 1st Session S.2230 - Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015 (November 3, 
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both overseas and in the domestic context (Lynch, 2010). This concept has been met with 
some scepticism, with the opposing perspective stating that groups like the MB act as a 
‘conveyor belt’ to extremism (Parliament UK, 2017). Lamentably, there is a lack of concrete, 
empirical evidence advocating for either argument, with the role played by the MB likely 
being considerably more complex.  
The prototype of the MB helps establish several features that should be possessed by 
potential firewall partners. The group in question should be relatively well established and 
ideally share the goals of violent extremists but not the methods. It is critical that the partner 
is effectively a competitor to these groups, rather than a moderate alternative. There is 
additionally a sense to be gained that a group or organisation need not be excluded from 
partnership based on its past behaviour or manner of operation in other regions and states. 
Even before examining other strands of extremism, some conformity can be anticipated; 
several of these features are likely to be replicated by groups in other forms of extremism; the 
MB has proven successful and, therefore, represents a model for others to emulate. 
Like the MB, GI is not native to the UK but represent a local permutation of the pan-
European Identitarian movement (Archie Henderson, 2020, pp. 20–21). Ideologically, GI has 
remained relatively consistent with the core axioms of contemporary far-right thought. In 
particular, the group is orientated around the idea that a ‘great replacement’ of native 
European populations is being undertaken, along with expressing concerns regarding the 
processes of globalisation and Islamisation, which together represent the key issues the group 
focuses on (Cosentino, 2020). The core ideas the group expresses have been used to justify 
violence by other groups within the extreme right, and GI itself has become entangled with 
acts of terrorism and calls for political violence, much to its consternation (Dearden, 2019). 
It is frequently asserted that Identitarian movements represent an attempt to launder 
aspects of well-established fascist ideology, presenting ethnonationalist policies with a more 
benign and accessible face (Richards, 2019). This perspective suggests that when compared 
with the wider far-right, GI is not differentiated by ideology but solely by methods and 
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nonviolence, this claim is not considered credible because of the wider movement the group 
inhabits. It is even possible to allege that plausible connections exist between GI and acts of 
far-right terrorism (Archie Henderson, 2020, p. 21). Although these links are often tenuous, 
they may be used to assert that GI supports such actions and is indirectly responsible for the ’ 
increasing prevalence of such events.  
Although the ‘firewall’ concept seems to have been contrived solely in relation to the 
MB, if it is to be considered viable, then the expectation follows that it would function 
similarly in relation to other equivalent forms of extremism. In the context of extreme right-
wing groups, GI represents a serviceable analogue for the MB; indeed, just as the MB has 
been identified as a typical example of nonviolent or ‘political Islam’, GI can be thought of as 
embodying ‘political’ ethnonationalism, Identitarianism or far-right extremism, depending on 
the terminology used. Instead of resorting to force, GI proposes achieving the restoration of 
an ‘ethnically European Europe’ largely through media engagement and political activism, 
not violence (Willinger, 2013, pp. 100–101). It can be postulated that GI shares a common 
language with violent extremist movements and, therefore, is ideally situated to reduce far-
right political violence and terrorism by providing an alternative pathway for susceptible 
individuals. Before examining if such a partnership would be of use, however, it should be 
determined if GI meets the standards for such a partnership established in relation to ‘political 
Islam’. First, however, it is important to understand the limitations of such an approach that 
are imposed by the differences between the two organisations. 
 
Key differences 
It is possible to mention some broad conformities between GI and the MB. These 
similarities are interesting but do not provide a basis to allege that the two are identical or that 
they are likely to have a comparable impact on the prevalence of terrorism within the UK 
context. It is better to contend that both groups are aspiring to embody the same model of 
activism while experiencing different challenges and obstacles arising from their disparities in 
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  A number of key differences between the two groups are likely to lead to divergent 
results should similar strategies be attempted in relation to both; first, it is important to specify 
the respective histories of the two organisations. Emerging in 1928, the MB developed in the 
context of extreme authoritarian suppression, an experience that has since dictated its often 
indirect approach (Kuran, 1998). Despite its often clandestine approach, the MB enjoys global 
brand awareness and a level of credibility that is arguably yet to be paralleled by any 
contemporary extreme right group. Standing in testament to this profile are the extensive 
number of studies and histories that have been produced. Generally emphasised are the 
group’s clandestine nature (Wickham, 2013, p. 91), its pragmatism and its track record of 
controlling its members (Vidino, 2020). The history of the movement and its global presence 
arguably contribute to the organisation’s credibility, and this can be understood as constituting 
a significant portion of the group’s appeal as a partner.  
In relation to GI, it is not possible to refer to an extensive cannon of literature to 
determine its history. GI is considerably younger, and although it has been mentioned in many 
surveys of the contemporary extreme right, it has yet to merit much in the way of specific 
attention. This is not to say that the group is entirely obscure, with it having been the subject 
of the focus of anti-right-wing activist groups both internal to the UK (Murdoch, 2019) and 
based on GI’s wider European presence (Beirich & Via, 2020). These reports generally 
emphasise connections and similarities between GI and the wider extreme right. The limited 
scholarship and information concerning the organisation does, however, indicate a number of 
characteristics that differentiate it from the MB. In addition to its relative youth, the groups’ 
origins are significantly different, and accordingly, GI does not seem to have yet experienced 
the same level of authoritarian suppression that contributed to the MB’s early development.5 
Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that GI or any comparable organisation within the 
UK’s far-right can draw on foreign support to the same extent as the MB. Yet as a pan-
European movement, GI has been identified as a growing force (Nissen, 2020). It is not 
 
5 This is not to say that GI has not faced sanctions, only that the level of suppression experienced by the MB in 
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inconceivable that GI, given time and the right incentives, may continue to develop, 
ultimately becoming a stable presence within the extreme right. 
Even a cursory examination of the two groups’ respective histories illustrates a 
number of key differences that would complicate juxtaposing any policy from one to the 
other. It is possible to suggest that the two organisations are in very different phases of 
development and, therefore, merit different solutions; moreover, it is challenging to present 
GI as meriting the same response as the more fully actualised MB.  
In addition to the different historical profiles of the MB and GI, it is important to 
consider the impact that their different ideologies are liable to exert. Even if the groups are a 
match in terms of their capability and sophistication—which is far from the case—then their 
identities alone would be sufficient to differentiate an official response. To begin with, the 
MB, which is unsurprisingly orientated around Islam, permits the group to frame its activism 
within the context of this religion, arguably permitting it to benefit from specific protections 
provided by law for religious groups. In the UK context, white race-based activism has faced 
challenges; any group advancing claims of ethnic superiority or the unique franchise of ethnic 
Europeans generally faces a range of legal sanctions and exclusions designed to limit their 
spread and discredit their core message (Goodwin, 2011). GI has a significant barrier to 
overcome in this regard.  
   When developing policies and laws to address nonviolent extremists in the UK 
context, it would be beneficial to understand the structure of both organisations in as much 
detail as possible. This is, unfortunately, not truly practicable, with many relevant features 
being the subject of contention at best and completely obscured in many cases. The MB is by 
nature clandestine, so it is naturally difficult to definitively understand, even though its 
presence in the UK can be understood as comprising a bare handful of core members who 
together with the groups’ international presence and serve to coordinate UK activities. Its 
more direct influence is facilitated though a number of partners and affiliates, a number of 
which have been identified. In lieu of clear and identifiable lines of control, the MB’s network 
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organisations are centred on influencing politics in the UK, several others further the work of 
the MB in other nations. Therefore, the true scale of the organisation is perhaps not best 
understood in its numbers but in the number of other groups and organisations over which it 
holds sway or influence. Its relatively small tangible profile has not prevented the UK 
government from treating it seriously, and the group illustrates the limitations of trying to 
understand nonviolent extremist organisations through a more conventional lens. 
An acknowledgement of the key differences between GI and the MB, both in terms of 
their history and ideology, serves to illustrate the boundaries and limitations inherent in any 
such comparison. Based on these differences, it is not appropriate to affect a direct 
comparison between the two organisations in terms of their likely impact or relationship with 
terrorism. It is possible to state that both are attempting to utilise the same broad approach; 
many of the strategies employed by the MB may be replicated by GI or a similar organisation 
within the extreme right. It is particularly important to emphasise that there is nothing to 
suggest that GI will ever rise to the level of the MB in the UK context. However, GI does 
prove that the model adopted by the MB can be successfully emulated within the specific 
context of far-right extremism. Based on this similarity, it is possible to examine if, 
differences notwithstanding, GI could represent a potential partner to address the growing 
threat of extreme right terrorism. This would require at the very least that GI is capable of a 
roughly comparable commitment to the same core behaviours as the MB; this will now be 
examined, beginning with the first key characteristic of nonviolence. 
 
Nonviolence 
The first central aspect that an organisation such as GI needs to demonstrate is 
nonviolence, or ‘rejection of violence’ (Parliament UK, 2017). Based on the interpretation of 
this principle in relation to the MB, it is appropriate to apply some boundaries. The MB, for 
instance, has not exactly been nonviolent in all its iterations (Vidino, 2011), and it would, 
therefore, be unfair to apply a higher standard to GI or other ‘firewall’ prospects. Vocal 
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overt manner should be sufficient, with some latitude in terms of past actions and the 
activities of the branches in other states. While recognising the violent potential present in 
such movements, it can be conceded that many nonviolent extremist groups are likely to 
remain so, as long as the prevailing circumstances remain constant. 
An organisation capable of acting as a ‘firewall’ must be vocally committed to 
nonviolence. The MB for instance has made a number of vocal commitments to nonviolence 
and, according to MB leadership, the group remains committed to this principle (Hamid et al., 
2017); this is a view that has been restated by MB members and associates in the UK context. 
While MB membership remains unclear, the identified proxies Islamic Society of Britain 
(ISB), Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) all use 
nonviolent approaches (Jenkins, 2015). In the case of the MB, there is a basis to be sceptical 
regarding the extent of this commitment based on the message articulated in its core doctrine, 
as well as the trajectory of the MB in past instances.  
What causes an organisation like the MB to transition into violence? The transition 
may be deliberate. Ultimately, it is emphasised that upon attaining a critical mass of support, 
its vision would have to be imposed within a nation by a vanguard of collected individuals 
(Qutb, n.d., pp. 64–65). This would suggest that any organisation inspired by the MB is 
concealing its violent aspirations until their objectives can be practically realised. Reinhart 
provides a second theory as to why the MB may resort to violence; examining the group 
under its early leadership, Reinhart suggests that the group’s initial resort to violence was the 
result of repeated frustration with the failure to achieve change through political means 
(Rinehart, 2009). Whatever the reasoning, there is no escaping the reality that the MB has 
transitioned into violence in the past, and similar eventualities are possible in the future.  
However, the UK MB’s commitment to nonviolence and recognition as a 
‘fundamentally nonviolent’ organisation by the UK government is not necessarily at odds 
with the past behaviour exhibited by the organisation outside of the UK. Although the 
organisation has been associated with terrorism and political violence in the past, it can be 
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support the use of force (Hamid et al., 2017, pp. 7–13). In addition to the general disposition 
of the global MB, it is possible to suggest that the circumstances that have caused the MB to 
support or facilitate terrorism and political violence are unlikely to be present in the UK; the 
MB is unlikely to muster a sufficient vanguard to make such a change in strategy viable, and 
at the current juncture, the MB in the UK is unlikely to give into this frustration, with 
quietism and political activism having yielded benefits that arguably exceed those attainable 
by force.  
In relation to nonviolence, it is possible to examine an organisation like GI and see 
similar trends emerging, even if they have not yet become established within the far-right 
Identitarian movement. At first glance, there is no denying that organisations on the extreme 
right have frequently undertaken a transition from vocal nonviolence to supporting or 
facilitating violence. A characteristic UK example here is National Action (NA), which began 
as a nonviolent organisation but was unable to maintain its outward rejection of violence, 
ultimately leading to the organisation being proscribed (Allen, 2019). It could be anticipated 
that GI, or for that matter any similar faction within the far-right, is susceptible to a similar 
process of collective radicalisation. For GI to be recognised as rejecting violence to a 
sufficient degree to be recognised as a ‘firewall’ against extremism, it must be demonstrated 
that it is unlikely to succumb to the same process as many similar organisations within the 
wider movement. 
There are several indications that GI could be considered sufficiently nonviolent to act 
as a candidate for partnership. It has been recognised as having made a vocal commitment to 
nonviolent action (Murdoch, 2019), even if there is scepticism surrounding this commitment. 
It is then possible to specify some similarities between the group’s ideological underpinnings 
and those of the MB, particularly as they pertain to the use of force. First, contemporary 
extreme right thinkers have long articulated the need for a ‘quiet revolution’, emphasising a 
long-term cultural change (Bar-On, 2013, pp. 88–89). Much like the MB, however, this long-
term nonviolent strategy serves as a potential precursor to collective violence once the 
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would be prohibitively difficult to achieve without the application of force; even without 
contending that GI are falsifying their aims, the goal of ‘remigration’ can be aligned with 
other past and current instances in which national movements have sought to restore a given 
territory to the exclusive use of an ‘indigenous’ population. Although Identitarians cite 
previous examples of ‘remigration’ upon which such a policy could be predicated (Zúquete, 
2018), such examples do not generally conform to a reasonable definition of being 
nonviolent.6 
GI has additionally recognised the risk of degeneration into a violent movement and 
has undertaken steps to prevent this from occurring, ejecting members as needed; indeed, the 
UK branch has been sanctioned for not supressing statements that did not conform to the core 
message of GI (Mulhall, 2019). Although such measures do not demonstrate the presence of 
internal compliance mechanisms comparable to those possessed by the MB, this represents an 
improvement on many previous iterations of the extreme far-right. Moreover, much like the 
MB, the organisation can be said to be aware that the overt use of force or direct incitement to 
commit acts of terrorism are not expedient under prevailing circumstances; not only does the 
example of NA illustrate this peril rather eloquently, but GI has demonstrated an awareness 
that the use of force is likely to alienate the public, setting back their mission (Willinger, 
2013).  
The capacity of GI to actually achieve the conditions required to realise their goals, 
however, is distant. It is possible to specify the repeated failure of violent extreme right 
organisations to transition into politics in the UK context, and given enhanced laws to 
proscribe organisations, GI can be assumed to recognise that a collective transition into a 
violent group would not serve its agenda. Much like the MB, it can be contended that in the 
absence of an extraordinary change in circumstances, GI is likely to remain committed to 
political activism. Like the MB however, it is not possible to consider the groups’ nonviolent 
methods as devoid of consequences. Over time, it can be anticipated that GI and other groups 
 
6 The evacuation of Europeans from Algeria along with other instances of decolonisation are used as touchstones 
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may garner more support for their policies; this may not be as a remote eventuality as it 
initially seems; the notion of ‘remigration’ has recently made headway in other European 
contexts (Nissen, 2020), and the risks of GI and the wider Identitarian movement building on 
the increasing regional prominence of these policies needs to be anticipated. 
Ultimately, it is possible to conclude that both the MB and GI make a commitment to 
nonviolence that is comparable in scope. There are naturally some practical differences 
between the two organisations that can be specified; GI is relatively less established and, 
hence, is less likely to possess the adequate mechanisms to ensure that its membership 
maintains a convincing outward commitment to nonviolence. It is possible to speculate that 
because no sanctioned relationship has been cultivated between such groups and the state, the 
incentives that have caused the MB to devote itself to a visible policy of nonviolence are not 
yet present in relation to GI. In addition to these variations, however, there is a basis to 
suggest that there is a normative distinction between commitments to nonviolence made by 
Islamist groups and commitments made by extremist far-right organisations; the latter are 
more likely to be viewed with scepticism in European contexts because of recent history 
(Ajanovic et al., 2016), at least for the time being. 
 
Commitment to democratic processes 
Alongside nonviolence, the status of the MB as a ‘firewall’ against violent extremism 
relies on its ‘commitment to democratic processes with inclusive governance and tolerance of 
other faiths and minorities’(Parliament UK, 2017). Generally, the MB has made a number of 
commitments to following the democratic process. It is possible to suggest that the group has 
seemingly adapted to democracy, with the case of the organisation in Egypt, Turkey and 
Tunisia seemingly demonstrating the organisation’s reconciliation with the democratic 
process (Hazran, 2020; Özcan, 2018). In the UK, the organisation has additionally made 
commitments to democracy though its identifiable proxies. This vocal support for democracy 
has led some to the conclusion that the group represent ‘participationists’ rather than 
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profound threat to Western democracies, and even though the nature of this threat is different 
from that posed by violent extremists and terrorists, it is no less profound (Vidino, 2011). 
Here, the threat is based on rhetoric rather than the use of force (Mohamed & Momani, 2015). 
This criticism can be levied based on the group’s core ideology and past behaviour. The 
group’s core ideology is naturally critical of democracy, which to them represents the 
characteristic example of a Western system of governance; moreover, democracy is generally 
considered subverting ‘rule by god’ (Kepel, 2004, pp. 31–32). Not being Islamic in nature, a 
democracy does not form part of the MB’s ultimate vision. The group is, however, committed 
to using whatever tools needed to advance its vision, the ballot being central to this mission in 
many cases (Vidino, 2009). Accordingly, it can be claimed that the MB supports the use of 
democracy in pursuit of an undemocratic end. 
GI, like the MB, recognises that the democratic process is useful. Like the MB, GI is 
rooted in a rejection of Western democracy, at least as democracy is currently expressed (Bar-
On, 2012). Ideologically, the Identitarian movement is grounded in the ‘nouvelle droit’ or 
‘new right’ philosophical movement, which is generally critical of democracy as it is 
currently understood, though the reasons for this rejection vary. Although various reasons are 
given for rejecting democracy, a general sense can be gained that Identitarians regard 
democracy as a key cause of Western civilisation’s current predicaments. An examination of 
the philosophical underpinnings of the ‘nouvelle droit’ does, however, reveal a commitment 
to utilising democracy and the freedoms upon which it is contingent. This commitment has 
been characterised as tactical rather than genuine (Bar-On, 2012). Indeed, this commitment to 
nonviolent methods has been aligned with the influence of the far left on the thinking of the 
far-right, particularly in terms of its methods (Bar-On, 2011). 
The commitment to democracy expressed by the MB and GI can perhaps be viewed as 
the result of a contamination, or the adoption of strategies from other ideological movements. 
The MB is recognised as having deviated from previously established Islamist tactics, 
drawing upon, among others, Marxist and fascist ideas (Hansen & Kainz 1, 2007). The 
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approach can be indicated even if this adoption is not recognised as a deliberate action on the 
part of the MB (Kandil, 2011, p. 39). It would, however, be peculiar to suggest that the group 
has existed in isolation since its inception, particularly given its expressed desire to utilise 
whatever methods available (Vidino, 2009) to achieve its ultimate aims.  
In the case of the extreme right and groups like GI, it is again possible to postulate that 
its disposition towards democracy is also a product of adoption. This can be asserted based on 
its intellectual origins within the new right, with key thinkers such as de Benoist (De Benoist, 
2017) and adopting the axioms of left-wing thinkers such as Gramsci for an extreme right 
audience. The contemporary Identitarian movement has additionally been described as neo-
Gramscian (Schlegel, 2020), having adopted the counter-hegemonic strategies described by 
the thinker. Indeed, examinations of the contemporary far-right often reveal the manner in 
which the techniques pioneered by the far left—specifically those relating to activism—are 
increasingly exhibited by extreme right groups and social movements (SPLC, 2018). There is 
the contention that such approaches may be acquired indirectly; it has been postulated that 
far-right extremists are often inspired by the approaches pioneered by Islamist extremists 
(Brzuszkiewicz, 2020). An adoption of a Gramscian approach by such groups may cause 
certain far-right groups to follow Islamists into nonviolence, just as they mirrored previous 
escalations in approach. 
To some extent, both GI and the MB can be thought of as having adopted an approach 
derivative of the programme of counter-hegemonic activism specified by Gramsci, though 
each has tailored their approach to their own audience and mission. This can be thought of as 
inculcating both with a disposition towards democracy that is ultimately hostile but unlikely 
to present an immediate threat, so long as the conditions do not noticeably alter.  
It can be contended based on the FCO’s definition and prevailing understanding of 
‘democratic values’ that some broader commitments need to be demonstrated, however. In 
terms of tolerance, it is possible to identify instances in which both GI and the MB fall short. 
It is undeniable that GI is vehemently opposed to diversity within Western society, suggesting 
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aligns the group with the MB, who regard comprehensive Islamisation as a goal (Parliament 
UK, 2017). In both cases, it is possible to identify a range of groups whose presence would 
not be viable in light of these long-term aims. It is possible, however, to speculate that it is 
feasible to overlook some of these shortcomings should the value of the partnership exceed 
the adverse consequences imposed by the group’s presence. 
 
International agreements 
Consistent with the ongoing process of globalisation and the transnational reach that 
extremist organisations often have, the importance of partnerships with political extremists 
who  conform to international agreements is undoubtedly necessary (Adamson, 2005). It 
would certainly not be expedient for the UK to foster a working relationship with an extremist 
organisation if this came at the expense of international censure, for instance. A growing 
concern is that the UK may suffer the consequences from harbouring extremists that are 
condemned in other national contexts; indeed, it can be contended that the UK has already 
suffered reputational damage for harbouring a number of extremists in this manner (Innes, 
2008). It is further possible to speculate that the failure to address extremist groups, even 
those of a political nature, could entail legal consequences, though this possibility is far from 
certain (Cassese, 2001, p. 994). 
The MB demonstrates the complex nature of the international sphere and its increasing 
relevance to domestic counterextremist initiatives. Here, the MB’s ambiguous position in the 
UK is partially a product of the group’s international profile. On the one hand, the MB in the 
UK have benefited from external factors, with other states having lobbied on the group’s 
behalf (Roberts, 2014). On the other hand, the MB has been designated as a terrorist 
organisation by several different nations.7 It is additionally important to understand how the 
MB’s UK presence could further the mission of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, both of 
which are unambiguously violent organisations the MB habitually supports. 
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Although the MB has, at best, an uncertain relationship with international agreements, 
it is worth mentioning the manner in which the MB is disaggregated from its activist proxies 
in the UK (Jenkins, 2015). The MB also conceals its membership, providing a plausible basis 
to deny the existence of any connection between its activities in the UK and the wider 
organisation. Given that this disaggregation is partially responsible for the group avoiding a 
designation of a terrorist organisation (David Cameron, 2015), it can be postulated that this 
feature insulates the groups’ presence in the UK from being held accountable for the wider 
MB’s often contentious international profile.  
Again, the manner in which the MB has demonstrated adherence to international 
agreements should inform the approach taken to other potential partners from different 
extremist movements. In relation to far-right organisations like GI, it is critical that their UK 
presence is sufficiently disaggregated from any international aspects of the movement that are 
inconsistent with international agreements. This may prove challenging; somewhat counter 
intuitively for an organisation with pronounced nationalist positions, GI has something of a 
transnational profile. Therefore, it is to be anticipated that any violent actions committed by or 
supported by GI internationally could impact the viability of any partnership within the UK 
context. 
It is also important to emphasise that partnering with an extreme right-wing 
organisation, even if the goal is to address terrorism and radicalisation, has significant 
drawbacks. Considering GI, for instance, the transnational nature of the organisation is a 
critical aspect to consider; if GI is to be considered a potential partner by the UK while 
concurrently being rejected by other European nations, this could have profound 
consequences for the UK’s reputation. The UK government needs to be mindful of the 
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Does the firewalling relationship make sense, and under what circumstances could it be 
used to address far-right extremism?  
 
As the case of the MB demonstrates, the UK government does not demand ideal partners in its 
efforts to address violent extremism; although the initial guidance on the concept of a 
‘firewall’ was not especially clear, the use of the MB as an archetypical case provides a more 
detailed picture of this arrangement. In terms of applying this strategy in the context of far-
right extremism, the current study has determined that the MB and GI intersect in some key 
areas; although GI is yet to demonstrate the staying power and sophistication of the MB, there 
is a basis to suggest that it envisions itself as occupying a similar position within its respective 
movement; it can be recognised as sharing the same ultimate vision as violent extremists 
within the extreme right, making a comparable commitment to nonviolence, democratic 
principles and international agreements to that made by the MB. Both GI and the MB 
recognise that the utility of nonviolent methods can exceed those of violent approaches. Both 
have committed to democracy, even though this is based on the realisation that, again, their 
methods and activism work well under such prevailing conditions. Although some ambiguity 
exists in the extent to which either organisation can be thought of as respecting international 
agreements, the absence of tangible, provable links between different branches and the 
group’s international leadership could be cited as a mitigating factor in both cases.  
 Naturally, there are some practical limitations that may preclude replicating 
partnership approaches within the extreme far-right context. It has to be conceded that GI is 
not as developed or sophisticated as the MB. Being the younger group, it is yet to accumulate 
many of the features that characterise the MB; the absence of these features limits their 
resemblance to one another. Whereas MB has demonstrated significant internal mechanisms 
for maintaining discipline within its members and affiliates, no organisation within the far-
right has yet demonstrated the capacity to do the same. It could be reasonably suggested that 
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Moreover, it is arguably the influence that the MB has over the wider Islamist 
movement that makes it an effective ‘firewall’ (Maher & Frampton, 2009, p. 23). The ecology 
of the far-right has some pronounced differences; at the current juncture, GI, or for that matter 
any other group, has yet to accumulate anything like the influence marshalled by the MB over 
other organisations within the movement. In addition to specifying the practical differences 
between GI and the MB, which are certainly apparent, it is possible to suggest that their 
respective extremist movements are different, perhaps different enough to complicate 
transferring strategies from one to the other.  
Limiting any application to the UK context, it can be postulated that the MB has 
benefited significantly from its status as a shareholder in preventing extremism and 
radicalisation (Vidino, 2010, pp. 118–119). In addition to providing the organisation with a 
degree of mainstream legitimacy, this relationship insulates the movement from competition 
with other Islamist groups, giving the appearance that it has forward momentum towards its 
ultimate aim. If a comparable offer was made to a nonviolent extremist group within the 
extreme right, it may prove to be a sufficient incentive to engender within its followers a 
deeper commitment to nonviolent methods while concurrently enhancing its status within the 
wider movement. Though such a step is not to be undertaken lightly, offering such an 
endorsement to an extreme right group would assist in producing a viable partner for 
countering violent extremism.  
It is also worth emphasising the degree to which the initial concept has been contested. 
The benefits and drawbacks of partnering with the MB—both in the UK and internationally—
have been well documented. The UK government is cognisant of these drawbacks, as 
evidenced by its own reviews of the organisation. Yet there is also a need to consider a 
demand problem. Successive instances of Islamist-motivated terrorist attacks have cemented 
the threat in both public awareness and the UK’s security agenda. As time has passed, the 
persistent risk of Islamist-motivated terrorism has motivated calls to expand and deepen 
partnerships with leaders and organisations in the Muslim community. The MB, which has 
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effectively capitalised upon this demand (Vidino, 2010, pp. 96–99). It is additionally possible 
to postulate that the demand arising from the alleged benefits of such partnerships has caused 
the UK government to be less critical regarding the partners it engages. 
  It is this issue of demand—so influential in facilitating partnerships with the likes of 
the MB—that is likely to drive the inclusion of organisations like GI. Just as the firewalling 
partnership was initially contrived to address the then preeminent threat of Islamist terrorism, 
as the relative threat of far-right motivated terrorism grows, more drastic measures are likely 
to be justified. In the UK context, the threat of far-right extremist terrorism is frequently 
equated with that arising from Islamist extremist groups. The difference in how the two 
threats are dealt with is becoming increasingly unsustainable. The very fact that potential 
partners can be identified within the far-right incites the question as to why collaboration has 
not been attempted yet.  
The more important question is perhaps more difficult: Would such an approach be of 
actual utility in terms of reducing terrorism and radicalisation? The results of partnering with 
the MB to address Islamic extremism are far too ambiguous and contested to conclude that 
firewalling is a good approach in its initial context. In relation to the extreme right, it is 
possible only to suggest that equally contested results will be achieved, with opinion likely to 
be just as divided.  
In terms of implications for policymakers, it is first worth noting that the approach 
pioneered by the MB is effective enough to be replicated. GI is perhaps the first of many 
extreme right groups that may attempt to identify itself as a necessary interlocutor between 
the British government and an often disaffected section of the UK population, mimicking the 
behaviour of the MB in relation to Muslims. Although such a move could conceivably be 
alleged to provide a means of addressing terrorism and political violence, it has clear 
drawbacks, many of which are made apparent by examining the manner in which ‘nonviolent 
extremism’ is defined. A partnership with any extreme right organisation that replicates the 
same flexibilities apparent in the current approach in relation to the MB would not necessarily 
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UK’s international profile. Decision makers should perhaps be mindful of the consequences 
of inclusion on the extremist movement in question. Just as the position of the MB was 
cemented by partnership, selecting an extremist group could effectively constitute an 
endorsement of the chosen group, providing it with access and resources not generally 
possessed by other extreme right groups. The UK government should perhaps be careful 
before playing ‘kingmaker’ in relation to what may otherwise remain a fragmented and 
divided extremist context. Finally, when juxtaposing strategies from the Islamist context to 
the extreme right, it is important to acknowledge that differences exist; although there is a 
need to exhibit parity and fairness between different forms of extremism, the very clear 





Generally, it has been noted that counterextremist strategies are applied almost exclusively in 
relation to Islamic communities, even though terrorism stemming from the far-right represents 
a comparable threat (Schanzer et al., 2016, p. 32). As the far-right continues to grow in 
prominence, this disjunction will become increasingly difficult to sustain.  
Although there are many potential programmes and approaches that could be carried 
over from Islamist terrorism to address extreme right-motivated terrorism, the present paper 
has focused on a single approach: the assertion that partnering with a nonviolent political 
extremist group can assist in preventing violent extremism. By examining the application of 
this approach to the MB, the criteria established to describe such an arrangement have been 
resolved in greater detail, permitting an exploration of the concept in other extremist contexts, 
specifically the extreme right.  
There are grounds to suggest that the UK could affect a partnership arrangement with 
a nonviolent extreme right group, mirroring the relationships cultivated with nonviolent 






Christopher J. Morris: Can partnership approaches developed to prevent Islamic terrorism be 








ISSN: 2363-9849          
this arrangement difficult, the conformity demonstrated between GI and the MB does suggest 
that the results of such an arrangement could be broadly reproduced; indeed, it can be 
suggested that based on the prior adoption of the MB, GI may have potential for being 
brought into such a partnership, broadly conforming to the criteria established for describing 
groups capable of acting as firewalls against violent extremism.  
There are, however, some considerations to keep in mind, both in relation to the 
specific approach of ‘firewalling’ and perhaps when attempting to carry the tactic across other 
strategies to address extreme right-wing terrorism. As the current paper has illustrated, the 
approaches utilised in relation to Islamist-motivated terrorism often have drawbacks that need 
to be taken into account before attempting to apply them in a new context. Indeed, the 
contention that partnerships with nonviolent extremist groups can exert a beneficial impact on 
violence and terrorism is contested to such a degree that applying a similar approach to the 
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